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I. Introduction
The essential role of the press in American politics
has been the subject of extensive study since Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote that the press “causes political life to
circulate through all the parts of that vast territory.”1
Tocqueville also wrote about the “necessary connection
between [political] associations and newspapers,”2 but never
saw the institutional press emerge as a political
association – or interest group – in its own right.
This article is the very beginning of an exploration
into the proposition that the institutional press uses the
litigation process strategically, in much the same way that
another interest group might lobby the legislative branch,
to shape its own regulatory environment, particularly the
First Amendment doctrine within which newsworkers must
operate.

The purpose of this preliminary work is to

examine, quantitatively, the degree of participation and
1

1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94 (R.D. Heffner ed., Signet
Classic 1984)(1835).
2
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (R.D. Heffner ed., Signet
Classic 1984 (1840). See also DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 55 (1951).
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success by the mainstream media in U.S. Supreme Court
litigation as parties and amici curiae.
Historically, the press had begun to organize itself
for its own political ends by the early Twentieth Century;3
by the end of that century, the organizations that
represent the news media were fully engaged in political
action. In a 1947 case, for example, the Supreme Court
absolved a journalist of criminal contempt for criticizing
a Texas county judge, partly on the ground that judicial
officers are insulated from public opinion.

In a rather

bitter dissent, Justice Jackson referred to the growing
power of the press as an interest group:
It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges
as so insulated from public opinion. In this very
case the American Newspaper Publishers
Association filed a brief amicus curiae on the
merits after we granted certiorari. Of course, it
does not cite a single authority that was not
available to counsel for the publisher involved,
and does not tell us a single new fact except
this one: “This membership embraces more than
700 newspaper publishers whose publications
represent in excess of eighty per cent of the
total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers
published in this country. The Association is
vitally interested in the issue presented in this
case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish
news stories and editorials on cases pending in
the courts.”4

3
4

See MICHAEL EMERY & EDWARD EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 574-581 (6th ed. 1988).
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947).
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Yet the press as player for its own account has hardly
been studied at all.

One might suggest several

interrelated reasons for this relative obscurity:
1.

The essence of the press’s self-image is public

service.5 The press does not think of itself, nor does it
care to be known, as a political actor.

Indeed, such a

role would strike most working journalists as a conflict of
interest; how can the press cover political institutions
with detached objectivity while it seeks favor from those
same institutions?
2.

Accordingly, the press does not generally interact

with either the executive or legislative branches in the
same way that other interest groups do.

While media

organizations are not above lobbying Congress for
legislation they want – broadcast and cable deregulation,
copyright protection, favorable postal rates, open meetings
and records laws, and so on – newsworkers are not
5

The preamble to the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics
(1996), http://spj.org/ethicscode.asp?, reads as follows:
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe
that public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and
the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is
to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair
and comprehensive account of events and issues.
Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties
strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty.
Professional integrity is the cornerstone of a journalist's
credibility. Members of the Society share a dedication to
ethical behavior and adopt this code to declare the
Society's principles and standards of practice.
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comfortable about it.

“As a general rule,” wrote

Newsweek’s Jonathan Alter to begin a recent column arguing
for a federal shield law, “journalists shouldn't be in the
business of lobbying Congress.”6
3.

By contrast, the press campaigns vigorously in the

courts for its most important institutional interests. But
the scholars whom one might expect to monitor their efforts
are AWOL.

Media law specialists in law and journalism

schools usually focus on substantive law (outputs), rather
than political action (inputs), and most political
scientists who study the courts have apparently been
distracted by theories that ignore institutional dynamics
altogether.7
Although the legal literature fully describes the
efforts of the institutional press to secure various First
Amendment privileges and other favorable legal rulings
through litigation,8 there appears to be no systematic study
of the press from an interest group perspective. Joseph

6

Jonathan Alter, You Shield Us, We’ll Shield You, NEWSWEEK, July 11,
2005, at 55.
7
Cornell W. Clayton, Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 29-30 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
8
E.g., Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First
Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225; Steven Helle, The NewsGathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 1.
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Kobylka’s work on obscenity9 comes closest to the approach
this study takes in theory, method, and substance.

Marc

Galanter’s concept of “repeat players”10 and various works
on the effectiveness of amicus briefs11 have also informed
this study.
Perhaps as more “new institutionalists” focus on
interest groups in the courts,12 the institutional press
will receive greater scrutiny.

This study offers a modest

beginning to that process. Part II reviews the interest
group literature that leads up to this study, while Part
III substantively examines its theoretical foundation. Part
IV discusses the methodology used for this study, and Part
V presents its findings. Part VI offers and brief
conclusion and some recommendations for further
exploration.
II.

Literature Review
The notion of interest groups as a political force is

older than the republic itself.

9

In Federalist No. 10,

Joseph Kobylka, A Court-Created Context for Group Litigation:
Libertarian Groups and Obscenity, 49 J. OF POLITICS 1061-1078 (1987).
10
Marc Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95,97 (1974).
11
E.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109
(1988); Caldeira & Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. OF POLITICS 782 (1990); Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U.PENN. L. REV. 743 (2000).
12
See Clayton & Gillman, supra note 7.
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Madison warned of the dangers of faction: “a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.” Garson discusses Calhoun’s
theory of the state as “regard[ing] interests as well as
numbers, considering the community as made up of different
and conflicting interests, as far as the government is
concerned, and takes the sense of each through its
appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense
of the entire community.”13
Tocqueville defines one form of political association
as consisting “simply in the public assent which a number
of individuals give to certain doctrines and in the
engagement which they contract to promote in a certain
manner the spread of those doctrines.” Suggesting that “the
right of associating in this fashion almost merges with
freedom of the press,” he asserts that associations so
formed are more powerful than the press, attracting more
like-minded members and increasing in zeal as they do.14

13

G. David Garson, On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique
of Process, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1505, 1507 (1974).
14
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
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Modern interest group theory is generally traced to
Arthur Bentley, whose The Process of Government is credited
with “developing a theory of government as ‘a process in
which interest groups are the players and protagonists.’”15
In fact, Garson cites a number of possibly more deserving
progenitors, including Bentley’s own teacher, Albion Small,
whose writings “contain many of the central points of
interest group theory:

(1) society conceived as composed

of a large number of groups; (2) no one of which can claim
to represent the general will; hence (3) the need for
elections to determine a rough approximation of the
collective volition; (4) determined by group forces at
various stages of the political process...”16
Wherever the credit or blame may lie, the interest
group theory languished for decades before being
“resurrected”17 in mid-century by, among others, David
Truman, whose The Governmental Process: Political Interests
and Public Opinion provides both “a theoretical framework
for analyzing group behavior, and the application of

group

influence in the political process”18 Importantly for our

15

Garson, supra
ARTHUR F. BENTLEY,
1967)).
16
Garson, supra
17
Id. at 1514.
18
Roland Young,
(1951).

note 13, at 1512 (quoting the editor’s introduction to
THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT xiii-xix (Peter Odegard, ed.,
note 13, at 1511.
Book Review, 278 ANN. AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 200, 201
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purposes, Truman includes a chapter on the role of groups
in the judicial process, pointing out that governmental
choices are “no less important to interest groups when they
are announced from the bench than when they are made in
legislative halls and executive chambers.”19 Truman points
out that group interests are “particularly close to the
surface” when constitutional questions are resolved,20 which
characterizes the great majority of cases involving the
media.
Like Truman, Martin Shapiro sees the Supreme Court as
something of a protector for groups who may be underrepresented in the legislative or executive branches,
either because they are still inchoate as interest groups
or because they have lost their political battle in those
arenas.21,22 Shapiro’s major work on the freedom of speech
and the First Amendment, however, barely mentions the
institutional press in either category; indeed, the
relatively heavy use of the Court by the media might be
seen as an example of a third category of “clientele”:
groups that are institutionally unsuited to lobbying the
political branches. Twenty years later, however, Shapiro

19

TRUMAN, supra note 2, at 480.
Id. at 494.
21
Id. at 487.
22
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36-37
(1966).
20
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had no difficulty analyzing the Supreme Court’s
constitutional libel doctrine in terms of government
regulation of an industry – the press.23
Finally, Galanter’s distinction between “haves” and
“have nots”24 among litigating parties provides an
interesting theoretical perspective for considering the
success of the institutional press as it has for a number
of studies of court outcomes.25 Media companies and
associations are obviously “repeat players” by Galanter’s
standards, and their opponents run the gamut from the
federal government to private individuals claiming libel or
invasion of privacy.
III. Theory
Interest group theory rejects the presumption that
government tries to advance the public interest, and rather
asserts with Madison that “all participants in the
political process act to further their self-interest.”26
While the institutional press most assuredly sees its selfinterest as co-extensive with the public interest, at least
23

Martin Shapiro, Symposium: New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation:
Regulatory Analysis, 74 CAL. L. REV. 883 (1986).
24
Galanter, supra note 10.
25
Herbert M. Kritzer, Martin Shapiro: Anticipating the New
Institutionalism, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 433 (N. Maveety ed.,
2003). See also IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M.
Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003).
26
E.R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review? 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35 (1991).
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with respect to First Amendment issues, that hardly negates
the application of the theory to this multibillion-dollar
enterprise.

The theory, moreover, sees government

regulation as a commodity, to be “purchased” by interest
groups who stand to benefit from favorable regulatory
terms,27 typically by expending resources on lobbying,
campaign contributions and, presumably, litigating.
As informed by Galanter’s “repeat player” concept,
interest group theory would predict that the media would be
highly successful in influencing the courts to “regulate”
favorably.

The press is readily recognizable as an

interest group “which has had and anticipates repeated
litigation, which has low stakes in the adjudication of any
one case, and which has the resources to pursue its longrun interests.”28 The press certainly has “ready access to
specialists,” given the experience and prestige of the
media defense bar, and, for the most part, the press is
free to choose whether or not to seek review of an adverse
decision in the lower courts. Accordingly, we would expect
“a body of ‘precedent’ cases – that is, cases capable of

27
28

Id.
Galanter, supra note 10, at 98.
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influencing the outcome of future cases – to be relatively
skewed toward those favorable” to the press.29
Indeed, Loffredo points out that the Court has
“displayed exceptional sensitivity toward elite
communicative modes,” including, “to a lesser extent, the
prerogatives of the mass media.”30 Overall, however, the
legal literature suggests that, although the media have
been remarkably successful in doctrinal areas involving
content regulation – notably prior restraint, libel, and
privacy cases – it has not fared as well in newsgathering
cases, including such issues as access to government
records and invocation of testimonial privilege. That is
what this study was expected to show, and it does.
Blanchard attributes this apparent anomaly to the
Court’s refusal to extend any special privilege to the
institutional press that is not available to the general
public, a posture deriving from the historic idea that the
press is merely an extension of speech.31 Alternatively,
Helle argues that the answer lies in the struggle between

29

Id. at 98-102.
Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern Court to the Historical
Evolution of Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 251 (Howard Gillman ed., 1999) (citing Mark
Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 804 (1997) (quoting
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141
U.PENN. L. REV. 1277, 1364 (1993))).
31
Blanchard, supra note 8, at 226.
30

11

The Press as Interest Group:
Mainstream Media in the United States Supreme Court

the press and the government for, respectively, access to
and control of information.32 Helle’s reading of the cases
appears to be most compatible with interest group theory,
with the government in these cases acting as an offsetting
interest group.33 This study might shed a little light on
each of these hypotheses.
The overall success of the press in these cases would
also seem to comport with findings that “amicus briefs
filed by institutional litigants and by experienced lawyers
… are generally more successful than are briefs filed by
irregular litigants and less experienced lawyers,”34
although the authors “cautiously” interpret their findings
as more supportive of what they call the “legal model” of
judicial decision-making than the interest group model.

Of

the three models they considered – legal, attitudinal, and
interest group – only the legal model would favor “filers
who have a better idea of what kind of information is
useful to the Court”; the interest group model, as they
conceive it, would give the edge to the side that generates
the greater number of briefs, regardless of the quality of

32

Helle, supra note 8, at 1.
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come
Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION, supra note 25.
34
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 11, at 750.
33
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the information.35

This hypothesis, too, is testable to

some extent in this study.
Still, the primary purpose of this study was exploring
the cases, rather than testing hypotheses, raising
questions rather than producing answers.

Perhaps it has

accomplished a little of both.
IV. Methodology
In discussing external pressures and the Court’s
agenda, Charles Epp points out that the American Civil
Liberties Union’s support for constitutional litigation
“profoundly affected the Supreme Court’s agenda” between
1917 and the early 1930s.36 He notes that the ACLU “offered
to sponsor appeals in Near v. Minnesota,37 but a wealthy
publisher stepped in and took over financing.”38 That
wealthy publisher was none other than Col. Robert R.
McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, who then headed the
Committee on Freedom of the Press of the American Newspaper
Publishers Association,39 which he dragged kicking and
screaming all the way to Washington on Near’s behalf.

35

Id.
Charles Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 7, at 266.
37
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
38
Epp, supra note 36, at 267.
39
FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG 79 (1981).
36
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Near v. Minnesota became the first important instance
of interest group litigation by the institutional press to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is only one of 100
Supreme Court cases in which the mainstream, institutional
press played a direct role as party or amicus (see Appendix
A). These cases, which comprise the database used in this
study, were selected by examining every case that appeared
in Congressional Quarterly’s CQ Supreme Court Collection,
Cases-in-Context: Speech, Press, and Assembly,40
supplemented by the tables of cases in two leading media
law texts.41
The first step in constructing the database was to
identify participation in the case by mass circulation news
media – primarily newspapers, magazines, broadcast outlets,
and cable television services – as well as their corporate
owners and associations formed by those corporations and
the principal actors within them.

Where such actors were

parties to the litigation, such as New York Times v.
Sullivan,42 the cases were automatically included.
Otherwise, both LEXIS and Westlaw databases were consulted
to determine whether mainstream media actors filed or
signed onto amicus briefs.
40

Supreme Court Collection, http://library.cqpress.com/ssc.
MARC A. FRANKLIN, ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed., 2000),
and DWIGHT L. TEETER & BILL LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS (11th ed., 2004).
42
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41
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Cases in which the only media actors could not fairly
be described as “mainstream” or “institutional,” such as
the World War I sedition cases or most obscenity cases, are
excluded from the database. Some very important media law
cases, such as Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,43 were excluded
under this criterion. Also excluded are cases in which the
press appears as both plaintiff and defendant, particularly
copyright and unfair competition cases.

And where

different cases were consolidated into a single opinion,
they were generally treated as separate cases for purposes
of this study.
Among the media players that feature prominently in
this study are the New York Times, The Washington Post, the
Chicago Tribune, and a few other active newspapers; Time
Magazine and occasionally a few other magazines; broadcast
television networks, including ABC, NBC, CBS, and PBS; and
cable outlets such as Turner Broadcasting (also part of
Time-Warner).

Organizational players include ANPA (and its

successor Newspaper Association of America), American
Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press Managing
Editors, National Association of Broadcasters, RadioTelevision News Directors Association, and Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press (see Table 7).
43

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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civil liberties groups such as the America Civil Liberties
Union often represent similar positions in media-related
litigation, they are not the primary focus of this article.
Once the cases were selected, they were divided into
three categories: cases involving content regulation (prior
restraint, libel, privacy, etc.), cases involving
newsgathering (access to records, open courtrooms,
testimonial privilege, etc.), and cases involving simple
business regulation (tax, antitrust, subscription sales,
etc.).

For each case, the principal opponent of the

media’s position was classified, using a variation on
Galanter’s scheme, as the federal government, other
governmental entities, other “repeat players,” and “oneshotters.”
Other independent variables include whether the media
actor was a party, an amicus, or both; how many amicus
briefs were filed on each side of the case; and which of
the leading media actors participated in the each case.
The outcome of the case, whether the press won or lost, is
treated as the dependent variable for most calculations.
V.

Findings
Overall, the press has been successful more often than

not, although by a relatively small margin.
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cases analyzed, the press won 53 and lost 47.

However, the

press has been considerably more successful in dealing with
content-regulation cases than with newsgathering cases.

Of

the 70 content regulation cases, the press won 43 and lost
27, while in the 24 newsgathering cases, the press won only
6 and lost 18.

This certainly comports with the findings

of Blanchard and Helle, although, alone, it says nothing
about the reasons why this would be true.44
Table 1 – Outcome by Type of Case
Won

Lost

Total

Content Regulation 43
Newsgathering
6
Business Regulation 4

61.4%
25.0%
66.7%

27
18
2

38.6%
75.0%
33.3%

70
24
6

70%
24%
6%

Total

53.0%

47

47.0%

100

100%

Chi square= 10.000,

53

2 df,

p = .007

As noted above, some member of the institutional press
was either a party to the litigation, participated as a
friend of the court, or both, in all 100 cases analyzed.
The press was significantly more successful when it was a
named party, winning 43 or 56.6% of the 76 cases in which
it was a named party, compared to only 10 or 41.7% of the
24 cases in which the press was represented only through
amicus briefs.
44

See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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It did not seem to matter at all whether the press as
party litigant was supported by additional press amici or
not, although it was more common for press party litigants
to have press amici support than not. While this in no way
detracts from Kearney and Merrill’s findings on the
importance of amicus briefs,45 it does suggest some
advantage to party status for which amicus briefs cannot
compensate.
Table 2 – Outcome by Party Status of Press
Won

Lost

Total

Party+Amici
25
56.8%
19
43.2%
44
100%
Party Only
18
56.3%
14
43.7%
32
100%
----------------------------------------------------------Total Party
43
56.6%
33
43.4%
76
76%
Amicus Only
10
41.7%
14
58.3%
24
24%
Total

53

53.0%

47

47.0%

100

100%

Chi square = 6.339, 1 df, p = .012

The media were also far more successful as petitioner
than as respondent, winning 38 of 54 cases or 70.4% as
petitioner, compared to 10 out of 36 cases or 27.8% as
respondent, probably for reasons having less to do with
characteristics of the press than with the theory that the
Supreme Court is more likely to review decisions it wishes

45

See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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to reverse.46 That notion finds some support in the fact
that, in the 10 cases that reached the Court on direct
appeal from a district court, the press won 5 of 7 cases as
appellee and lost all 3 cases as appellant.

In other

words, the Court affirmed 8 of 10 cases on direct appeal
when it did not have the discretion to deny certiorari.
Table 3 – Outcome by Press as Petitioner/Respondent
Won

Lost

Total

Petitioner
Respondent

38
10

70.4%
27.8%

16
26

29.6%
72.2%

54
36

100%
100%

Total

48

100%

42

100%

90

100%

Chi square = 15.744, 1 df, p = .000

Much has been written about the American Civil
Liberties Union as amicus,47 and its presence in cases
involving the institutional press certainly appears to have
affected the outcome. The press significantly improved its
winning percentage when the ACLU lined up on the same side,
winning 75.8% of the time. Moreover the press lost 5 of the
6 cases in which the ACLU argued against the press
position.

46

H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
280 (1991).
47
See Epp, supra note 36; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A
HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990).
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Table 4 – Outcome by ACLU Participation
ACLU Position

Won

Lost

Total

Pro Press
Anti Press

25
1

75.8%
16.7%

8
5

24.2%
83.3%

33
6

84.6%
15.4%

Total

26

66.7%

13

33.3%

39

100%

Chi square = 7.977, 1 df, p = .005
Looking at the opposition, the press did much better
against state and local agencies, including trial courts,
winning 23 of 34 cases or 67.6%, than against the federal
government, winning only 8 of 24 or 33.3%.

This certainly

comports with Kritzer’s findings that the federal
government is, indeed, the proverbial 800-pound gorilla,
but it does not reflect the considerably smaller advantage
he attributes to state and local government entities.

The

explanation may lie in the “linkage” Kritzer found between
the success rate of state and local government entities and
the resources of their opponents.48
Even most state attorneys general do not command the
legal talent that the institutional press can assemble. The
lawyers mobilized on behalf of the press, such as Floyd
Abrams, James Goodale, Jane Kirtley, Bruce Sanford, Lee
Levine, and others, comprise a literal “Who’s Who” of the

48

Kritzer, supra note 33.
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media law bar.

The press faced only a half-dozen non-

governmental “repeat players” and won 4 of the cases.

Table 5 – Outcome by Type of Opponent
Won

Lost

Total

Federal Government 8
Other Government
23
Other Repeaters
4
One-Shotters
18

33.3%
67.6%
66.7%
50.0%

16
11
2
18

66.7%
32.4%
33.3%
50.0%

24
34
6
36

24%
34%
6%
36%

Totals

53.0%

47

47.0%

100

100%

53

Chi square = 7.235, 3 df, p = .065

Perhaps the greatest surprise was the finding that the
institutional press only broke even against 36 so-called
“one-shotters” that it faced in Court.

This flies in the

face of all the variations on the Galanter theme. Looking
more closely at the individual cases, however, suggests two
possible explanations. One explanation involves the four
newsgathering cases,49 where the losing record is easily
understood in light of the discussion above.
49

The cases were Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (cameras in
courtrooms); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (broken promise
of confidentiality); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1998) and Hanlon v.
Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1998) (police ride-alongs ).
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The second is more complicated.

The press won 11

libel cases against one-shotters and lost 11, won 3 privacy
cases and lost 2, won 2 prior restraint cases and lost 1,
won 2 other content-related cases and lost all 4
newsgathering cases. Most of the libel cases were decided
after 1964 when the Court revolutionized libel law in New
York Times v. Sullivan. Nearly all of the cases that
followed made important doctrinal refinements to answer
constitutional questions raised by the Sullivan
prescription: what is “actual malice”? who is a “public
figure”? etc.
Thus, one suspects these cases, which account for 22
of the 36 one-shot cases, were accepted and resolved almost
without regard to the litigants as the Court wrestled with
very technical questions of pure law.

Two of the non-libel

cases, which sounded in privacy and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, could also be explained as
refinements of the Sullivan doctrine.
Yet another unexpected finding from this study was the
relatively little difference in press case outcomes among
the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts – the only Courts
with enough press cases for comparison – despite the marked
conservative trend from 1953 to 2005. Indeed, the press was
most successful in the Rehnquist Court, winning 16 of 29
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cases or 55.2%, and least successful in the Burger Court,
before which the press won 26 of 51 cases or 51%.

Table 6 – Outcome by Court (Chief Justice)
Won

Lost

Total

Fuller
0
2
2
White
0
1
1
Hughes
2
0
2
Stone
2
0
2
Vinson
1
1
2
----------------------------------------------------------Warren
6
54.5%
5 45.5%
11 100%
Burger
26
51.0%
25 49.0%
51 100%
Rehnquist
16
55.2%
13 44.8%
29 100%

The study also found that amicus briefs submitted by
the press or urging the same position taken by the press
more than doubled the number of amicus briefs taking the
opposing position, 267 to 118.

Of the major press

participants, the Newspaper Association of America
(formerly the American Newspaper Publishers Association)
was the most active, with 35 amicus briefs submitted or
signed, followed closely by the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, with 30 briefs and three appearances
as named party.
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Table 7 lists the 16 leading press participants.
Table 7 – Leading Press Participants
Participant

As Party

As Amicus

Newspaper Association of America/ANPA
Reporters Comm. for Freedom/Press
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Radio Television News Directors Assn.
National Association of Broadcasters
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
National Broadcasting Company (NBC)
Society of Prof. Journalists/SDX
New York Times
Chicago Tribune
Washington Post
Los Angeles Times
National Newspaper Association
Magazine Publishers Association
Associated Press, AP Managing Editors
Time, Inc.

0
3
0
2
0
5
3
0
2
1
3
1
0
0
0
4

35
30
28
22
24
17
19
21
18
18
15
15
13
11
11
5

VI.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study
This study has only scratched the surface of what

promises to be a goldmine of information that is as deep as
it is wide. Vertically, the study should be expanded to
include certiorari decisions, as well as decided cases, and
federal and state courts at every level.

Horizontally,

further study might compare pure speech and non-mainstream
press cases to see how the results might vary in the
absence of a coherent interest group.

More work is needed

to explain why individuals do so much better against the
institutional press than theory would predict.
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But there can be little doubt that the institutional
press is an interest group to be reckoned with in the
Supreme Court, its aversion to such a designation
notwithstanding.

Over the past century, and especially

since 1964, the press has secured for itself the greatest
legal protection available anywhere in the world. And while
some of that protection has come from Congress, by far the
greatest share has come from the Supreme Court’s expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment’s Press Clause.
Appendix – Cases Used in this Study
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